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Abstract
This paper assesses the existence and extent of transition cost for the OECD economies
associated with the increasing Chinese competition in the export markets. We find
that intensified Chinese competition is an important factor in explaining structural
changes not only within the manufacturing sector but also of the economies as a
whole. In our empirical analysis which is guided by a simple extension of the Melitz
Model we employ panel data at multiple levels of aggregation. The data reveal con-
siderable adverse effects on export volume and industry-specific output in OECD
countries as a result of increased Chinese competition. These distortions originat-
ing from the export market also affect structural variables within the manufacturing
industries. Even at a regional level, changes in socioeconomic indicators can be as-
sociated with intensified Chinese export competition. Within the framework of our
theoretical model, the mechanisms behind these observations are the following: The
increased Chinese competition leads to a decline in exports and overall output, im-
plying a decrease in average productivity and wages. This induces the reallocation of
labor to the low-wage service sector, which in turn results in a reduction of average
household income.
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1 Introduction
The emergence of China as a major player on the world market for manufactured goods
is well documented. Driven by institutional changes, the successive adoption of new tech-
nologies and the existence of a vast pool of labor, China’s exports have increased rapidly
along the intensive as well as the extensive margin. In 1995, the volume of China’s manu-
facturing exports relative to the exports of the OECD countries amounted to 5%. By the
year 2010 this ratio had grown to 22%.1 The economic size and the momentum of such
an export growth are - in this combination - unprecedented. The result is a considerable
increase in competition in the global market for manufactured products.
So far however, the analysis of potential effects for developed countries resulting from
tougher Chinese competition in the export market has received little empirical attention.
A cursory review of the manufacturing exports of the OECD countries does not reveal
any negative effect of increased Chinese competition. In fact, OECD exports have even
grown relative to GDP over time (Bergoeing et al., 2004). However, if one divides the
manufacturing products of the OECD members into two groups, one facing strong and
another facing weak Chinese export competition, diverging patterns emerge. As Figure
1 shows, the value of exports of the strong competition group relative to GDP increased
marginally between 1988 and 2000 and has subsequently decreased, despite a continuous
decline in transport costs. On the other hand, the exports of manufacturing products facing
only weak competition have grown considerably relative to GDP. Additionally, Figure 2
shows that the share of OECD manufacturing export products that face strong Chinese
competition has steadily increased over time. The two graphs suggest that the strong
Chinese competition in the world market leads to a decline in OECDmanufacturing exports
and that the range of products facing strong competition has increased.
Considering the important role of the export sector in explaining structural changes within
industries (Melitz, 2003) and the findings of Bernard et al. (2003), that even for a rela-
tively closed economy, changes in the export market can have considerable effects on firm
productivity and labor turnover, the lack of research directed towards the analysis of the
effects for developed countries associated with increased Chinese competition in the export
markets is surprising. This paper contributes to filling this gap.
The goal of this study is to investigate the extent to which shocks in the export market for
manufacturing goods, induced by increased Chinese competition, carry over to the industry
1Source: UN Comtrade Database.
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Figure 1: Weak and Strong Chinese export Competition Shares
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Note: The strong (weak) competition group is categorized as follows: Industries for which export
competition, as defined by Eq. (3), is above (below) average.
level and to the economy of developed countries as a whole. The main focus thereby lies
on the empirical investigation. To embed our regression analysis in a theoretical context
we develop a simple extension to the Melitz Model (Melitz, 2003) presented in Redding
(2010). This model provides us with qualitative predictions and allows for an economic
interpretation of the regression results.
Based on the theoretical model we expect that increased Chinese export competition results
in a reduced export volume, leading to a drop in manufacturing wages along with a decline
in average productivity. These changes result in the contraction of the manufacturing
labor force, inducing an aggravated decline of total manufacturing output. Additionally,
the structure within an individual manufacturing industry is affected by the increased
export competition. In particular, our model predicts that the average firm size decreases
as a consequence of the reduced average productivity. Within the framework of the model a
decreasing wage rate will induce reallocation of labor to the low-pay service sector, resulting
in an overall income loss. The magnitude of these distortions will depend on the size of
the initial manufacturing labor force. These qualitative predictions imply that the Chinese
export competition is likely to have a broad distortionary impact on OECD economies,
3
Figure 2: Export Competition at the Product Level
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ranging from the manufacturing export sector through to the average household income.
To empirically assess the effects of Chinese export competition we employ panel data at
different levels of aggregation. By progressively inspecting different economic constituents
of industrial activity in our empirical analysis we hope to unfold a consistent picture of
how the Chinese competition effect in the export market is transmitted to more aggregated
levels. To our knowledge, we give the first extensive account of transition costs faced
by OECD countries associated with the emergence of China as a global player in the
manufacturing export market.2
In the first step of the empirical analysis we use bilateral export data for the OECD
countries and find that Chinese export competition, measured by the import share of
Chinese products in the export market (i.e. of the trade partner country), has a significant
effect. An increase of 1 percentage point in Chinese export competition leads to a decline
in the home country’s export volume of about 0.5%, constituting a considerable impact.
In a second step, we investigate whether increased Chinese export competition is associated
with a decrease in total output of the manufacturing industries. In line with the theoretical
2In our analysis, it is not possible to derive any implications regarding the effects on total welfare.
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predictions, we find a negative relationship. Moving from the lowest to the highest quintile
in Chinese export competition is associated with a reduction in output of roughly 21%,
signifying a considerable distortion of industrial production. We also find substantial effects
on structural variables at the industry level of the EU countries.3,4 As expected, increased
Chinese export competition is associated with a reallocation of labor, a decline of average
productivity, a drop in the wage rate and a decrease in average firm size.
In a third step we construct a measure for Chinese export competition faced by regions
within the individual EU countries. We then investigate how the changes within the in-
dustrial sector associated with increased Chinese export competition influence the regional
socioeconomic characteristics. In line with the qualitative predictions of our theoretical
model we observe that regions faced with intensified competition experience a reallocation
of labor from the manufacturing to the service sector as well as a drop in per capita house-
hold income. The results therefore indicate that the increased Chinese competition is an
additional source of explanation for the increasing relative importance of the service sec-
tor in developed countries. Lastly, we also find a negative association between the export
competition measure and outward migration at the regional level.
In all the regression setups we additionally include a measure for Chinese import compe-
tition which is defined as the imports from China as a share of the home country’s total
imports. The results confirm the presence of significant import competition effect at some
aggregation levels. However, we find that the Chinese export competition effect is domi-
nating and able to explain a higher share within the variation. Overall, our theoretical and
empirical results indicate that the transition costs associated with the intensified Chinese
competition - specifically in the export market - are considerable.
The paper is structured as follows: First we review the literature related to our analysis.
Second, we briefly describe the most important features of our theoretical model and
present the qualitative predictions derived. Since the focus of this paper lies on the empirics,
the detailed presentation of the model is deferred to the appendix. Third, the data are
described. In a fourth step, the empirical analysis is carried out and results are presented.
Section 5 concludes.
3When referring to the EU, we explicitly mean the EU countries within the OECD. We additionally
include Norway and Switzerland in order to increase our sample size. The results below are not driven by
the inclusion of these two countries.
4The restriction to EU countries within the OECD is dictated by data limitations.
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2 Related Literature
The literature revolving around the emergence of China as a major player on the world
market for manufactured goods is vast. However, studies specifically concerned with as-
sessing the effects working through the export market channel have mostly been restricted
to the quantification of the crowding-out effect for developing countries specializing in the
production of labor-intensive goods. Generally, the effects found are rather small. Han-
son and Robertson (2008) estimate that the percentage of forgone exports in the years
2000-2005 due to increased Chinese competition is between 0.5% and 1.6%. For the con-
sumer goods exports of Asian countries, evidence for a crowding-out effect is found by
Eichengreen et al. (2007). A crowding-out effect for Asian countries is also documented by
Xing (2011) in the market for information communication technology products. Regard-
ing the substitution of Latin American imports for Chinese products in the U.S. market,
Moreira (2006), López-Córdova et al. (2008) and Montenegro et al. (2010) find small or
non-significant effects. Using an alternative measure for competitive threat, the results
of Jenkins (2008) indicate that the negative impact on Latin American exports could be
considerably stronger than found in the studies mentioned above.
For OECD countries, possible effects from increased export competition from Chinese
products have received little attention, although Schott (2008) documents an increasing
coincidence between export bundles of the OECD countries and China. In addition, Cadot
et al. (2011) document an increase in the concentration of imports of the OECD countries
with respect to their geographical origin starting around the year 2000. This concentration
process is entirely attributable to China’s growing import share in OECD countries. To
the authors’ knowledge, the issue of whether home industries or labor markets are being
affected by increasing Chinese competition in the export market has only been addressed
in Autor et al. (2012). They incorporate the growth of Chinese imports in third mar-
kets within a measure for local labor market exposure to Chinese products. However,
the assessment of the relative importance of the export sector is not possible within this
framework.
The analysis of potential effects associated with increased Chinese competition in home
markets - i.e. import competition - has attracted more interest. Regarding the impacts on
the labor markets, studies consistently find a negative correlation between manufacturing
employment and exposure to imports from China. Using information on local U.S. labor
markets, Autor et al. (2012) find that increased exposure to Chinese imports is negatively
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associated with the share of workers employed in the manufacturing sector. In line with
the results of Bernard et al. (2006), indicating that industrial plant growth and survival
are negatively associated with exposure to imports from low-wage countries, Bloom et al.
(2011) , Mion and Zhu (2011) as well as Álvarez and Claro (2009) find evidence that import
exposure to Chinese products is associated with lower plant-level employment growth.
Álvarez and Claro (2009) and Sargent and Matthews (2009) additionally find a positive
correlation between Chinese import penetration and the market exit probability of firms in
the manufacturing sector for developing countries. On the basis of industry-level data for
10 European countries operating in selected manufacturing sectors, Peltonen et al. (2008)
establish a negative association between the import penetration of Chinese products and
company profitability.
Regarding the impact on manufacturing wages, the results are mixed. Alvarez and Opazo
(2008), in line with the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, attribute a negative
wage effect in the manufacturing sector to the import penetration of Chinese products. On
the other hand, several studies document skill and technology upgrading as a reaction to
increased import competition (see e.g., Mion and Zhu (2011), Bloom et al. (2011) or Alvarez
and Opazo (2008)). This implies a positive effect on productivity and wages. In line with
these results, Isgut (2006) finds a positive wage effect for Canada’s manufacturing workers.
Autor et al. (2012) do not find a significant effect on the wages in the manufacturing
sector.5
These inconclusive results regarding the manufacturing wages also relate to the strand of
literature documenting wage rate rigidities, implying employment adjustments instead. For
example Babecký et al. (2010) assess downward wage rigidity in real and nominal terms
for a set of European firms. Similarly, Druant et al. (2012) find that the manufacturing
sector in European countries adjusts wage rates less frequently than prices.
An additional field related to our study is the ongoing discussion about the causes of the
continuing relative growth of the service sector in developed economies (see e.g. Autor and
Dorn (2012)). These studies find, that the impact of trade - most prominently offshoring
- plays only a minor role in explaining the cross-sectoral labor movements.
All in all, the literature analyzing the effects of increased Chinese competition working
through the export channel and focussing on developed countries is scarce. This paper
5However, the reader should bear in mind that the impact on wages can only be measured for the
workers remaining in the manufacturing sector. The effects for workers leaving the sector can be quite
different, as documented by Ebenstein et al. (2009).
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aims - starting with the next section - at filling this gap.
3 The Theoretical Model in a Nutshell
In this section we briefly outline the main properties of our theoretical model which we
use to derive qualitative predictions for the regression analysis. Our model builds on the
seminal work of Melitz (2003) and the repsective versions of the Melitz model in Arkolakis
et al. (2008) and Redding (2010). Since the focus of the paper lies on the empirical
investigation, we defer the detailed analytical presentation to the Appendix A.
The model includes three countries: Home, Foreign and China, where the first are two
representative developed (OECD) economies. The production side of Home and Foreign
consists of three sectors: First, a Walrasian service sector producing a non-tradable ho-
mogeneous good. Second, a manufacturing sector producing a single differentiable and
tradable good under Melitz type conditions, e.g., the firms are heterogeneous with respect
to productivity. The third sector, a Walrasian high-tech sector, produces a tradable homo-
geneous good. The manufacturing as well as the high-tech goods are classified as industrial
products. The two sectors combined can be thought of as the secondary sector.
The labor pool in Home and Foreign is of fixed size and consists of two types of workers:
high-skilled and low-skilled workers. The former are all employed in the high-tech sector.
The low-skilled workers have two choices: either work in service or in manufacturing. To
qualify for the jobs in the manufacturing sector, however, they have to invest in a fixed
upgrade cost. The workers are heterogeneous in terms of this cost. The labor supplies in
the service and manufacturing sector therefore depend on the wage differential between
those two sectors, implying that supply is elastic for these two sectors.
The demand in Home and Foreign is derived from an upper tier logarithmic utility function
which only comprises the service and the manufacturing goods. This means, the high-tech
good will not be consumed in the developed countries.
For reasons of simplicity and tractability, we assume that China only produces varieties of
the manufacturing good. Hence, it creates competition solely in the manufacturing sector.
The Chinese demand side is kept equally simple: only the high-tech good is imported.
This one-way trade between China and the two other economies implies that the developed
countries pay their imports of Chinese manufacturing varieties with the exports of high-
tech products. By fixing the Chinese exports to the high-tech imports the competition from
8
China in the manufacturing sector is exogenous. Thus, the characteristics of the Chinese
manufacturing sector are exogenous with respect to the ones in Home and Foreign. This
exogeneity assumption can be rationalized with the continuous low level of Chinese wages
(e.g. Ceglowski and Golub (2011)) and the fact that Chinese exports are influenced by
state interventions.6
The setup described above allows us to derive qualitative predictions for the impact of
increased Chinese export competition, defined as the import share of Chinese products in
Foreign.7 All the results analogously apply to an increase in Chinese import competition.
The key consequence of an increased Chinese export competition is the decline in for-
eign expenditure on products from Home. The lower levels of exports lead to a drop in
employment in the more productive export sector, resulting in a decline in the manufac-
turing wage rate and a decrease in average productivity of the manufacturing firms. These
changes could be characterized as ’reversed Melitz effects’. The decline in the wage rate
leads to a reduction in labor supply in the manufacturing sector, resulting in a decrease of
total income and contraction of total output.
Regarding the number of active firms in the sector, two opposing effects are at work. The
decreased wage rate allows the entry of less productive firms implying an increase in the
number of enterprises. The lower wage rate, however, is associated with a labor force
contraction in the manufacturing sector. Thus, no clear prediction can be derived for the
number of active firms. The direction of the effect depends on the relative size of the output
elasticity and the wage rate elasticity (both with respect to Chinese export competition)
in the manufacturing sector.
For the economy as a whole, we observe a reallocation of labor from the manufacturing to
the low-pay service sector as a reaction to increased Chinese export competition. This rise
in the service labor supply implies a decline in the wage rate for the employees in service.
Together with the decreased manufacturing wage rate, these effects result in a decline of
average income of the economy. However, because we have classified the manufacturing as
well as the high-tech goods as industrial products, the wage effect in the secondary sector
as a whole is not clear. The direction of the effect depends on ratio of labor supply and
wage rate elasticities with respect to Chinese export competition in the manufacturing
sector.
6E.g. the exchange rate regime. Figure 3 in Ceglowski and Golub (2011) clearly illustrates the effect
regime changes have on relative unit labor costs.
7Export (import) competition is denoted by vcF (vcH ) in the theoretical model.
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Summing up, within the framework of our model the increased Chinese competition in
the export markets affects several important economic variables. Starting with the next
section, we will investigate the extent to which our theoretical predictions are reflected in
the data.
4 Data
As mentioned in the introduction, we analyze the impact of Chinese export activity for
OECD countries8 for different levels of data aggregation: the product level, the industry
level and the regional level. To do so, we construct four different datasets whose structure
we will explain in the following.
4.1 Product-Level Data
The product-level data is extracted from the UN Comtrade Database and categorized ac-
cording to the four-digit Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS).9
Each observation originally contains the following information: The value that is exported
from a home country (the exporter) to the partner country (the importer), measured in
current US dollars within a given product code and year. Depending on the quantity of
partners, the number of observations within a given product code and year varies for the
exporters. As mentioned previously, we restrict our attention to the exports of manufac-
turing goods10 of the OECD countries. Consequently, we drop all exporters not belonging
to the OECD. Also, we do not include observations, where China is the trade partner.
In a next step, we augment the dataset by adding total exports, exports to China, total
imports, and imports from China to the home and the partner countries. Additionally, we
also include country-specific information on GDP levels. The last information is part of
the World Development Index. The final dataset includes the years 1988 to 2010.
All variables used in the analysis at the product level along with their descriptive statistics
as well as their sources are listed in Table C.1 in the appendix.
The information contained in the dataset described above is used for the construction of
8A list of the countries for which data are available at the different levels of aggregation and which can
thus be included in the analysis is given in Table C.5. We do not include countries that have joined the
OECD in 2010 or later.
9An analysis using more detailed trade data is not possible due to the scarcity of such information.
10More specifically, four-digit HS codes between 2800 and 9700 are included in the analysis.
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the remaining three datasets. However, some intermediate steps have to be taken in order
to adapt the information for use, which we describe in the following.
4.2 Industry-Level Data
For the analysis at the industry level, we construct two datasets using two additional
sources. The UN Industrial Commodity Production Statistics Database provides informa-
tion on the output of various industries within a given nation for a wide range of countries.
The industries are categorized according to the UN List of Industrial Products which is
based on the Central Product Classification (CPC Ver 1.1). The values reported are mea-
sured in current US dollars. Unfortunately, this source does not provide information on
structural characteristics of manufacturing industries, such as employment or earnings.
This kind of information is available from the Eurostat Statistics Database.11 The data
in this database are restricted to the EU-27 countries, Norway and Switzerland. Subse-
quently, when talking about EU countries, we refer to Norway, Switzerland as well as the
EU-27 countries that are members of the OECD. The Eurostat industry classification dif-
fers from the UN categorization. The measures are grouped according to the statistical
classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE Rev. 1.1).12
Since the trade data presented in Section 4.1, in addition to being reported on a more
disaggregated level, are categorized according to a different classification, the trade flows
have to be matched into industries in order to analyze the effects of changing trade volumes
on industry-level indicators. In our case, we have to assign the HS codes to the UN and
the Eurostat industry categorizations, respectively. Problems arise whenever a trade-data
category cannot be assigned to a single industry. In such cases, we are unable to determine
what portion of the total trade flow reported for a particular, not uniquely assignable HS
code, pertains to which industry. The procedures employed when facing this problem are
described in Appendices B.1 - B.2.
After having constructed the correspondence tables, we are able to aggregate the trade data
to industry levels. We build sums whenever the product-level information is of absolute
value and take averages if the information is in relative terms. Again, we augment the
11The Eurostat Database also includes information on output levels. Because of the restriction to the
EU countries and the more cumbersome matching process (see B.2), we choose to use the UN data for the
output analysis.
12The NACE classification encompasses not only manufacturing, but also other sectors. Again, we
restrict the analysis to the manufacturing sector, implying the inclusion of the NACE codes 17 - 37.
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datasets by adding country-specific information about GDP levels. Both final datasets
span the years from 1995 to 2008. Descriptive statistics of the dataset resulting from the
two matching procedures are provided in Tables C.2 - C.3 in the appendix.
4.3 Region-Level Data
Socioeconomic indicators, such as sector-specific compensation, employment or information
on migration are not differentiated with respect to industries but with respect to geograph-
ical areas. More specifically, the variables provided by Eurostat are grouped according to
the Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units (NUTS). For our purposes, we use the
NUTS 2 level, which subdivides Norway and the 27 EU member countries into 277 regions.
We connect the product-level data from Section 4.1 to the NUTS-level observations by
first using the HS-NACE correspondence table to aggregate the trade data. The resulting
variables are at the country level. Here however, we operate at a regional level. There-
fore, we need to construct region-specific measures for the exposure to trade. The details
of the procedure are described in Section 5.5. The dataset is augmented by country-and
NUTS-specific control variables. Again, the variables are available for the years 1995 -
2008. Descriptive statistics on this dataset are depicted in Table C.4.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Setup and Definitions
Before discussing specific regression specifications and presenting results, we want to clarify
the general terminology and methodology employed in the following analysis.
5.1.1 Terminology
Exports are defined as the flow of products from the home country to the (trade) partner
country. The exporting home country (industry) faces competition from China through
two channels: Firstly, increased imports from China can put pressure on domestic pro-
ducers; e.g., by offering products at low prices. Changes resulting from increased import
competition will subsequently be referred to as the ’import-competition’ effect. Secondly,
producers in Home can be affected by Chinese competition in the export market - i.e. in
the market in the trade partner countries - resulting in a decrease of exports. This effect
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will be called the ’export-competition’ effect. Henceforth, when talking about import or
export competition, we explicitly refer to competition from China. In this study, we are
particularly interested in the analysis of the impact of the later effect. That is, we want to
assess to which extent export competition influences the export volume as well as economic
variables on more aggregated levels of the developed home country.
5.1.2 General Methodological Remarks
Our measure for the degree of export competition (EC) is a partner country’s share of
imports from China relative to its total imports within a given product category. In
turn, import competition (IC) is defined as the share of imports from China to the home
country relative to the total imports within a given product category. Thus, we argue that
in markets with a high share of imports originating in China, the competition is fierce,
whereas in markets with a low share of Chinese products, the competition is moderate.
The measures defined are consistent with the definitions in our theoretical model. They
are based on the observation that the price of Chinese products is relatively low compared
to products originating from OECD countries (see e.g., Schott (2008)). Formally, the
measures can be expressed as:
ECi,j,k,t =
ImCj,k,t
ImTj,k,t
, home country: i = 1, .., I
with partner country: j = 1, .., J
ICi,k,t =
ImCi,k,t
ImTi,k,t
product: k = 1, .., K
time: t = 1, .., T,
(1)
where ImCj,k,t are the imports of partner country j from China in the product class k at time
t, and ImTj,k,t are the total imports from partner j in product category k at time t. Since we
conduct the empirical analysis at various data-aggregation levels, we postpone the detailed
explanation of the econometric model and the construction of explanatory variables to
the respective sections. However, at all stages of the analysis we add fixed effect-specific
variables in such a way that each observation point in the data is fully identified by the
time index and the fixed effects index. Therefore, we will only exploit variation over
time and do not rely on any variation between the identifiers. Thereby we avoid any
endogeneity issues stemming from time-invariant unobserved effects on, for example, the
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home-partner-product level. To eliminate country time-variant effects, such as trends in
demand or technology, we augment each regression by country-specific time trends. In
doing so, we hope to solely capture general effects and economic mechanisms that are valid
across countries under the assumptions of panel data models. Additionally, we always add
time-fixed effects and cluster the standard errors at the respective identifier level. Our
panel data are sufficiently disaggregated at the country level13 to allow for enough degrees
of freedom for such an exercise. Also, they are not restricted to an individual country.
This is an enhancement compared to existing studies. A final general remark concerns the
robustness of our estimations: Since we drop China from the potential partner country list,
we note that all our results are robust to the inclusion of the log of exports to China on the
respective aggregation level. Also, we include the total volume of exports in all regression
settings in order to control for the importance of the export market.
5.2 Chinese Competition and the Export Volume
A crucial building block of our study is the empirical validation of the negative impact of
Chinese competition on the export volume of the OECD countries. Our theoretical model
predicts that an increased export competition will result in a decline in demand for home-
country goods as a higher portion of the export market is served by Chinese manufacturing
goods.
We test this hypothesis using the most disaggregated information available: product level
data. The regression model with EXi,j,k,t, the exports of the home country i to the trade
partner (export market) j in product class k as the dependent variable is the following:
ln(EXi,j,k,t) = β0 + β1ECi,j,k,t + β2ICi,k,t + β
′Xi,j,k,t + vi,j,k,t, (2)
The error term vi,j,k,t = µi,j,k + ut + i,j,k,t consists of a country-partner-product-specific
effect (µi,j,k), a time effect (ut), and an idiosyncratic error term (i,j,k,t). ECi,j,k,t is the
measure for the export competition within a given fixed effects group over time. Also
included in Eq.(2) is the measure ICi,k,t for direct import competition. Finally, Xi,j,k,t
constitutes a set of control variables including absolute trade volumes as well as the GDP
per capita for the exporter and partner country (both in log).14
13We additionally have an industry and a regional dimension.
14Because we employ fixed effects estimations we do not need to control for the actual size of the
countries.
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Table 1: Chinese Competition and Export Volumes of the OECD (EU) Countries
Dependent variable: Log exports
OECD EU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Export -0.507*** -0.466*** -0.646*** -0.426*** -0.490*** -0.573***
competition (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Import -0.264*** -0.430*** -0.220*** -0.351*** -0.185***
competition (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Log GDP p. capita 1.241*** 1.236*** 0.790*** 1.389***
of home country (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.029)
Log GDP p. capita 1.529*** 1.530*** 0.949*** 0.970***
of partner country (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Log imports from China 0.026*** 0.019***
of home country (0.001) (0.001)
Log total imports 0.227*** 0.266*** 0.295***
of home country (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Log imports from China 0.035*** 0.029***
of partner country (0.000) (0.001)
Log total imports 0.309*** 0.372*** 0.304***
of partner country (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Obs. 10431524 10431524 10431524 12424602 12424602 7881099
adj.-R2 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.82
F-Test 9228.142 9068.791 11612.902 9593.407 13733.230 11374.207
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the identifier level in parentheses;* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; FE
estimator regressions in all columns with time dummies, home-partner-product-specific effects and country-specific
time trends. Columns 1 to 5 refers to the full OECD sample. Column 6 makes use of the restricted EU sample. Log
GDP per capita is in constant international US dollars. The log import variables, both for the home-country and
the partner-country, are at product-level.
The reduced form model in Eq. (2) includes the exports (EXi,j,k,t) as log on the LHS as
well as part of the export competition measure (ECi,j,k,t). This has to be evaluated from an
econometric perspective in the context of the reflection problem in Manski (1993). Clearly,
the measure ECi,j,k,t is not linear in the log of EXi,j,k,t, which is sufficient for identification
in our case (Brock and Durlauf, 2001).15
Table 1 depicts the results of the regression Eq.(2). As mentioned in the previous section,
we have included time dummies, home-country-specific time trends and home-partner-
product-specific fixed effects in all regression setups. Columns 1-5 exploit the full OECD
sample, whereas the data in column 6 is restricted to the EU countries.
Column 1 shows the result of our base regression when the measure for export competition
15The same holds true in the case of the log of the world exports (Jensen’s inequality).
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and the GDP per capita variables are included. The coefficient of the GDP per capita
variables are positive and with magnitudes in line with the literature on gravity equations;
e.g., Rose (2004), indicating that the model is appropriate. The value of the EC coefficient
implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of imports from China in the trade-
partner country results in a decrease of -0.51%16 in the export volume of the home country.
As the share of imports from China has increased steadily across most trading partners,
this finding indicates a considerable cumulative effect for the exports of the developed
countries.17 The effect is further amplified by the fact that Chinese exports grow not only
within but also across industries.
In column 2, we include the import competition measure in the regression model. This vari-
able is not partner-specific, and hence the variation is limited to the home-country-product
level. Because of the large number of observations and the resulting precise estimates, we
are confident that problems regarding multicollinearity are negligible, despite a strong cor-
relation between the export and import competition measures. The import competition
variable is revealed to have a negative and significant effect on the exports. The magni-
tude is fairly constant across the different setups. Reverting to the theoretical model, the
negative IC coefficient can be explained as follows: Increased import competition results
in a decline in domestic sales for firms and thereby lowers average productivity. This also
reduces the export volume. According to our estimates in column 2, a 1 percentage point
increase in the share of imports from China in the home country triggers a change in the
export volume of −0.26%. The magnitude of the IC coefficient is smaller than the one of
EC measure in all the regressions reported in Table 1.
In the remaining columns 3-6 we estimate different setups to test for robustness and con-
sistency. With the introduction of several import volume measures, column 3 shows that
it is not the absolute volumes of imports from China that matter, but its share of total
imports. This supports our choice of relative measures for the export competition and im-
port competition. Higher import volumes from China might simply be a result of increased
demand equally affecting all trade partners.
Column 6 reveals that the effects for the EU countries within the OECD sample are similar
to the findings obtained when using the unrestricted dataset. We additionally note that
16100
(
exp−0.507/100−1) = −0.51%
17To obtain a feeling for the economic magnitude of the effect we can calculate average loss in export
volume (in thousand U.S. dollars) associated with a 1 percentage increase in EC. Using the mean (log)
export value from Table C.1 we get: −0.507exp11.38/100 = −443. In other words, a loss of 6 % in average
export volume.
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the results are robust with respect to the time periods included in the regression.18
Overall, our findings show that export competition due to Chinese products causes a
significant reduction in the exports of the OECD countries and, consequently, a decline in
bilateral trade among these countries. Whether these results carry over to more aggregate
levels will be analyzed in the following sections.
5.3 Chinese Competition and Industry Output
In this section we examine whether the Chinese export and import competition effects are
economically meaningful enough to explain variation in the aggregated output of manu-
facturing industries within the OECD countries. Given the results in the previous section,
combined with the analytical results of our theoretical model, we expect that this will
indeed be the case. According to the model, the impact of export competition on total
output of individual manufacturing industries should be more pronounced compared to the
effect for export volume.
Confined by the availability of data, we now have to operate at a more aggregate level com-
pared to the HS classification. The industry-specific output data is categorized according
to the UN classification. We therefore have to aggregate the product classes of the trade
data to the industry level according to the procedure described in Appendix B.1. Since an
industry’s output cannot be apportioned to the different export partners of a home country,
we additionally have to aggregate the trade variables within a given industry classification
over the trade partners. This aggregation is trivial in regard to absolute volumes, where
we merely sum across the trade partners. The relative measure for export competition is
constructed in the following manner:
partner country: j = 1, .., J
WECg =
K∑
k=1
1I{k ∈ g}EX
T
k
EXTg
J∑
j=1
ImCj,k
ImTj,k
EXj,k∑J
j=1EXj,k
with product: k = 1, .., K
industry: g = 1, .., G.
(3)
where for notational convenience, time and home country dimensions were omitted. WECg
is the weighted export competition (WEC) measure for a given industry in the home
country. 1I{k ∈ g} is the function indicating whether the product k belongs to the industry
18Specifically, when taking the time span 1995-2008 - the period for which the data is available in the
Sections 5.3 to 5.5 - the results are very similar. Eg., the point estimate of the EC coefficient in column 3
is -0.617 in that case.
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g. EXTk is the sum of home country’s exports of product k across all trade partners.19 EXTg
is the total value of the home country’s exports within the industry class g.20 The first ratio
in Eq. (3) therefore represents the weight of the individual product classes with respect to
the total industry exports. The partner country’s share of total imports originating from
China is given by the second ratio. This import share is weighted according to the relative
importance of the trade partner for the home country which is measured by the percentage
of total exports destined for partner country j. By construction, WECg is between 0 and
1 and can therefore be interpreted as the weighted average share of imports from China
across all partners and products.21 To construct the weighted import competition measure
(WIC) at the industry level we apply the following procedure, where again, time and home
country dimensions have been omitted:
product: k = 1, .., K
WICg =
K∑
k=1
1I{k ∈ g}Im
C
k
ImTk
ImTk
ImTg
=
ImCg
ImTg
with
industry: g = 1, .., G,
(4)
WICg therefore represents the home country’s percentage of total imports originating from
China that falls into the industry class g.
Having aggregated the trade data, no distinction between individual trade partners can be
made any more. Therefore, we drop the term ’Partner Country’ and subsequently speak
of ’Export Market’ instead.
We set out to test whether WEC and WIC have a significant impact on the output of
manufacturing industries in the OECD (EU) by using the following regression model:
ln(Oi,g,t) = β0 + β1WECi,g,t + β2WICi,g,t + β
′Xi,g,t + vi,g,t, (5)
where the error term vi,g,t has a similar structure as in Eq.(2), except now the identifier is
at the country-industry level. Oi,g,t is the output of industry g in country i in the year t.
The set of controls Xi,g,t includes country-specific variables and the absolute amounts of
industry-specific trade data.
Table 2 displays the estimation results. The coefficients listed in columns 1-3 are obtained
using the whole sample, whereas for the regression results presented in column 4 only the
19Formally: EXTk =
∑J
j=1EXj,k
20Written formally: EXTg =
∑K
k=1 1I{k ∈ g}
(∑J
j=1EXj,k
)
=
∑K
k=1 1I{k ∈ g} EXTk
21In probabilistic terms, this measure corresponds to the expectation across partners and products with
the weights as distributions.
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Table 2: Chinese Competition and the Output of Manufacturing Industries
Dependent variable: Log industry output
OECD EU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weighted export -1.693*** -1.439*** -1.357*** -1.718***
competition (0.112) (0.119) (0.119) (0.180)
Weighted import -0.516*** -0.714*** -0.718***
competition (0.100) (0.100) (0.153)
Log imports from China 0.037*** 0.036***
of home country (0.004) (0.005)
Log total imports 0.225*** 0.191***
of home country (0.015) (0.019)
Log imports from China 0.029*** 0.022**
of partner country (0.009) (0.011)
Log total imports -0.013 -0.007
of partner country (0.017) (0.021)
Obs. 31293 31293 31293 25306
adj.-R2 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
F-Test 218.876 214.969 209.477 239.897
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the identifier level in parentheses;* p <
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; FE estimator regressions in all columns with country-
industry-specific effects; country-specific time trends; the GDP per capita and the
aggregated GDP per capita of the trade partner both in log of constant international
US dollars and time dummies. Columns 1 to 3 refers to the full OECD sample.
Column 4 makes use of the restricted EU sample. The log import variables, both for
country and partner are at industry level and aggregated across products and trade
partners.
restricted EU sample is used. Column 1 reports the separate effect of WEC on an industry’s
output. The estimated coefficient is statistically significant and indicates that an increase
in the WEC of 1 percentage point results in a decline in the industry’s output of −1.68%.
The size of the coefficient is reduced when the WIC measure is included in the regression
(column 2), but still remains at −1.439. Column 3 reports the value of the point estimates
when the trade volume control variables are included in the regression. The values of the
coefficients of export and import competition converge somewhat, but remain quite stable
and significant.
In all the setups, the point estimates of WEC are substantially larger than the ones for
WIC. The WEC coefficient of −1.357 translates into a decline in the industry output of
21% when moving from the lowest to the highest quintile. Hence, a strong increase in
China’s competitiveness implies a severe distortion of the output in the affected industries.
The magnitude of the WEC coefficient also indicates that the elasticity of the total output
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with respect to WEC is higher than elasticity of the export volume.22 This is in line with
the predictions of our theoretical model.
The significant coefficient of WIC is compatible with our theoretical model. The increased
competition in the home market leads to a decline in sales which is accompanied by a
decrease in average productivity. Even though the magnitude of the coefficient of WIC
(−0.713) is smaller than for the WEC, the implied economic impact is non-negligible.
Moving from the lowest to the highest quintile in WIC results in a decline of output of
−9.8%.
Looking at column 4, we can see that the effects of the export and the import competition
measure are stronger when reducing the sample to the EU countries, despite the restricted
dataset exhibiting a slightly lower exposure to import competition.23
We conclude that the increasing relative share of Chinese exports has a harmful effect
on the production volume of manufacturing industries in OECD (EU) countries, both
via the export as well as the domestic market. According to our point estimates, the
indirect effect is dominating, stressing the importance of the export market. Within the
framework of our theoretical model, this implies that average productivity of the firms and
the size of the labor force in the respective industry are more sensitive to shocks in the
export markets than to changes in the home market. The considerable distortion in the
output volumes suggests that structural variables within the industries faced with increased
Chinese competition will also be influenced. We investigate the existence of such effects in
the next section.
5.4 Chinese Competition and EU Industry Aggregates
From the theoretical model presented in Section 3 we expect the following changes in
structural variables for industries faced with increased Chinese competition in the export
market: The wage rate declines as the export sector contracts. This induces workers
to leave the industry and additionally allows less productive firms to enter the (domestic)
market, thereby lowering average productivity within a given industry. This in turn results
in a decrease in average firm size. A straightforward prediction regarding the effect on
the number of active firms is not possible because of two counteracting effects: reduced
productivity and diminished labor supply. The first is associated with an increase, the
22Cf. Section 5.2
23On average, EU countries have a lower exposure with respect to import competition, but a more
pronounced exposure to WEC.
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Table 3: Chinese Competition and the Structure of Manufacturing Industries
Dependent Log compensation Log Average labor Log employees Log number
variable: per employee employment productivity per firm of enterprises
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
L. Weighted export -0.295*** -1.969*** -69.328*** -1.228*** -0.782***
competition (0.103) (0.262) (17.035) (0.271) (0.217)
L. Weighted import 0.011 0.035 43.668** -0.490** 0.551***
competition (0.117) (0.237) (18.579) (0.220) (0.193)
L. Log imports from China 0.008** 0.023*** -4.562** 0.001 0.015*
of home country (0.003) (0.007) (2.050) (0.008) (0.008)
L. Log total imports 0.023*** 0.075*** 2.988 0.016 0.045***
of home country (0.008) (0.015) (2.041) (0.018) (0.017)
L. Log imports from China -0.030*** 0.079*** 9.924** 0.006 0.083***
of partner country (0.007) (0.015) (4.973) (0.018) (0.018)
L. Log total imports -0.006 -0.037** -0.799 -0.023 -0.012
of partner country (0.009) (0.017) (2.618) (0.021) (0.019)
Obs. 4053 4130 3344 4130 4361
adj.-R2 0.99 0.99 0.87 0.96 0.99
F-Test 775.788 27.110 17.546 41.556 56.762
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the identifier level in parentheses;* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01;FE
estimator regressions in all columns with country-industry-specific effects; country-specific time trends; the GDP per capita
and the aggregated GDP per capita of the trade partner both in constant international US dollars and log and time dummies.
The log import variables, both for country and partner, are at industry level and aggregated across products and trade
partners (if necessary) according to the Eurostat classification. All LHS variables are on annual basis. The lagged value is
indicated by L..
latter with a decrease in the number of enterprises. Given the strong impact of export
competition on an industry’s total output, however, it is to be expected that the number
of firms will decline.
Due to the availability of data, the subsequent empirical analysis is restricted to the EU
countries within the OECD. The EU data on the characteristics of industries are categorized
into broader classes compared to the UN classification (see Section 4). Nevertheless, the
data-aggregation process is analogous to the one described in Section 5.3. The regression
model is equivalent to Eq.(5). However, in this section we will be using industry structure
measures as dependent variables. Because we assume that changes in the composition of
trade materialize with a time lag subsequent to changes in an industry’s structure, we use
the first lag of the explanatory variables.24
Table 3 presents regression results. Lagged WEC enters significantly in all regressions.
24In the previous sections, we have assumed that import and export competition directly (contempo-
raneously) affect the dependent variables. Using lagged values on the explanatory does not qualitative
change the results of the regression models Eqs.(2) and (5).
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Also, the results regarding the WEC coefficient are robust with respect to the exclusion of
the WIC variable and the control variables for absolute trade volumes in all setups.
Column 1 shows the negative impact of WEC on the average annual compensation per
employee.25 The coefficient implies a −0.30% decline as a consequence of a 1 percentage
point increase in WEC. Compared to the WEC coefficient of −1.969 in column 2, where
we use the log of the industry-specific employment as the dependent variable, the wage
effect is small. In terms of our theoretical model this finding can be explained with the
elastic labor supply, which dampens the wage effect through labor force adjustments. When
moving from the lowest to the highest quintile in WEC, the wage rate decreases by −2.6%
whereas an industry’s employment decreases by 17.4%. Looking at the beta coefficients
(not reported here) shows that the standard deviation specific effect of WEC is two times
higher than the GDP per capita effect.
Regarding the labor productivity measured in thousand euros per person employed, a 1
percent point increase in WEC yields a reduction in the apparent labor productivity of
roughly 0.7 thousand euros.26 This translates into a decrease in productivity of about 6.1
thousand euros when moving from the lowest to the highest quintile in WEC. According
to our theoretical model, the decrease in productivity is associated with a decline in the
average firm size. Indeed, as shown in column 4, we find that the average number of
employees per firm decreases by −1.22% when WEC increases by 1 percentage point.27
In column 5, WEC enters significantly and negatively. An increase in Chinese export
competition of 1 percentage point leads to a reduction in the number of firms within an
individual industry of −0.78%.28 Arguing within the framework of our theoretical model,
this indicates that labor elasticity with respect to export competition is high enough to
25Compensation is defined as the wage rate plus the employers’ social security contributions. Using the
(net) wage rate as dependent variable yields very similar results.
26Since labor productivity and its log transformation are only correlated with 0.26 across the sample
and 0.03 within the fixed effects groups, we do not use the transformation here. Additionally, using the
log transformation of the labor productivity results in a non-linear relationship with WEC. The results in
this case are qualitatively similar when augmenting the regression model by a non-linear effect.
27Additionally, the theoretical prediction of decreasing profits can also be verified empirically. In regres-
sions not reported here, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in WEC is associated with a −2.43%
decline in gross operating surplus.
28For the illustration of the economic magnitude of the effects presented in Table 3, we take the mean
of the dependent variables from Table C.3 to calculate: average reduction of −0.269 exp2.96/100 = −0.05
thousand euros in the annual wage rate, average decrease of −1.958 exp0.04/100 = −0.02 percentage points
in the employment within the industries, average reduction of −1.228 exp3.13/100 = −0.28 thousand workers
per firm, average decline in the number of active firms of −0.782 exp7.22/100 = −10.69 associated with a 1
percentage point increase in WEC.
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offset the change in the cut-off productivity for firm entry. Thus, even though a lower cut-
off productivity allows low-productivity firms to enter the market, the dominating labor
force contraction leads to a decline in the number of firms in the individual industries.
This implies that the demand elasticity with respect to Chinese export competition is
more sensitive than the wage elasticity, indicating that the demand for a given domestic
firm’s variety declines faster than its labor costs.
Compared to the results for the WEC, the estimates for the WIC coefficient do not accord
quite as well with our theoretical predictions. We find no significant effect of WIC on the
industry wage rate or on the industry employment. Based on our theoretical model, these
results imply that WIC should not influence any variables at more aggregate levels, since
all the effects in the model affecting the economy as a whole stem from changes in the wage
rate induced by a reallocation of labor. Staying at the industry level, we find that WIC
has explanatory power with respect to changes in labor productivity, average firm size and
the number of active enterprises. As column 3 shows, a 1 percentage increase in WIC is
associated with an increase in labor productivity of about 0.44 thousand euros per worker.
This implies, that the productivity increases by 3.8 thousand euros when moving from the
lowest to the highest quintile in WIC. The sign of the coefficient contradicts the theoretical
predictions. However, the result is not robust to the exclusion of the export competition
variable and therefore makes an interpretation of the WIC effect difficult. Again in line with
our expectations is the result in column 4. Increasing import competition by 1 percentage
point diminishes the average firm size by −0.49%. Finally, in column 5 we find that the
number of active firms is positively associated with WIC, standing in contrast to the results
for the export competition measure. This result is once again not robust to the exclusion
of the WEC variable.
Summing up, the results presented in this section indicate that Chinese competition in the
export market is an important factor in explaining structural changes within manufacturing
industries in the EU countries. Import competition on the contrary only plays a secondary
role. Given the relatively small fraction of people employed in the manufacturing sector29
it will be interesting to investigate whether the strong effects found at the industry level
affect the (regional) economies as a whole.
29In the EU approximately 21% of the employees work in manufacturing (Eurostat Database).
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5.5 Chinese Competition and Socioeconomic Changes at the Re-
gional Level
Up to now, our analysis of the effects resulting from increased Chinese competition has
been restricted to the manufacturing sector. In this section we investigate whether the
distortions within this sector result in observable effects at a regional level detached from
any industrial classifications. More specifically, we investigate whether a reallocation of
labor takes place from the manufacturing to the service sector and whether average wages
in these two sectors are affected. Also, we analyze whether aggregate employment figures,
income and migration behavior are influenced by Chinese competition. The data used
as dependent variables are collected at regional (NUTS30) level and consequently do not
allow for differentiation among industries. Instead of within-industry variation, we will
now exploit within-NUTS variation. This allows us to control for country and NUTS-
specific effects as well as for country-specific time trends. Hence, we are able to determine
systematic effects that are independent of country-specific features.
In order to use the trade data together with the variables reported at the NUTS level, we
have to construct regional-specific measures for the impact of trade activity. Information
on the relative importance of a given industry within a NUTS region allows us to weight
the trade data accordingly. The weighting procedure employed is illustrated for the ex-
port competition measure. Analogy applies to the construction of the import competition
measure.
country: i = 1, .., I
WECi,z =
G∑
g=1
WECi,g
Empi,z,g
Empi,z
∀ z ∈ i, with NUTS: z = 1, .., Z
industry: g = 1, .., G.
(6)
WECi,g is the country-industry-specific weighted export competition measure from Eq.(3),
z = 1, .., Z are the regions according to the Eurostat classification, Empi,z is the total
labor in manufacturing of the NUTS region and Empi,z,g/Empi,z represents the NUTS-specific
employment share of industry g.31 Hence, we weight the country-specific variable WECi,z
30More precisely, we conduct our analysis at the NUTS 2 level. For notational ease, we drop the numeric
term. The regional NUTS classification is discussed in more detail in Section 4.
31Again it might help to picture the weighting in terms of a discrete sample space, where each industry
carries a probability (the labor share). Thus, the weighted export competition (WEC) is similar to an
expected value. Since we have information on total manufacturing labor, we can assign to each industry
its weight within the sample space. Then, it does not matter if some industries have missing data. In this
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with the employment share of a given NUTS region under the constraint that z ∈ i. By
weighting all trade variables in such a manner, we transform trade-related data at the
country level to the NUTS level. The variation in the data now stems from the assumption
that trade activity within a given industry is more relevant to NUTS regions with a high
employment share in the affected industry.
Since we use within-NUTS variation, the size of the NUTS region relative to the country
does not matter. Only the manufacturing employment structure, that is the employment
share of a given industry within the NUTS region, is relevant. The relative effect is therefore
the same across differently sized NUTS regions, as long as the employment structure is
similar.
The testable predictions derived from our theoretical model are the following: As a con-
sequence of the increased Chinese export competition we expect the wage rate in the
(low-skilled) manufacturing sector to decline and therefore labor to reallocate towards the
service sector. The higher labor supply in service is associated with a decrease in the
service wage rate. The average household income is also expected to fall. Bearing in mind
that we have defined the high-tech as well as the manufacturing sector as pertaining to the
secondary sector, we cannot - in contrast to the service sector - derive a clear-cut predic-
tion about the effect on the wage rate. The direction of the competition effect depends on
relative size of the labor supply elasticity and the wage rate elasticity of the manufactur-
ing sector with respect to Chinese competition. Given the moderate wage effect found in
Section 5.4 and keeping in mind the sticky European wage rates, we surmise that the labor
supply elasticity will be dominating. Therefore, we do not expect a negative association
between the overall industrial wage rate and increased export competition. Because we did
not find a significant effect of WIC in Section 5.4 neither on the industry-specific wage rate
nor on the industry labor allocation, we do not expect any effect of WIC at the regional
level. In the model, changes affecting the economy as a whole are driven by alterations in
wage rate consequently resulting in labor reallocation.
To asses the effects of Chinese competition observable at the regional level, we estimate
the following regression equation:
yi,z,t = β0 + β1WECi,z,t + β2WICi,z,t + β
′Xi,z,t + vi,z,t, (7)
where yi,z,t are the different dependent variables. The error term vi,g,t has a similar structure
case we set the weight to zero without affecting the other industry weights.
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Table 4: Chinese Competition and Regional Labor Market effects
Dependent Industrial Service Log industrial Log service
variable: labor share labor share compensation compensation
per employee per employee
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L. Weighted export -0.318*** 0.456*** -0.473 -0.129
competition (0.071) (0.103) (0.533) (0.282)
L. Weighted import -0.011 0.026 0.270 0.394
competition (0.062) (0.086) (0.469) (0.271)
Obs. 1946 1946 1946 1946
adj.R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00
F-Test 99.725 119.876 458.642 859.106
Notes: Weighting is according to Eq.(6). The individual dimension is the NUTS level.
Robust standard errors clustered at the identifier level in parentheses;* p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; FE estimator regressions in all columns with NUTS-level-specific
effects; country-specific time trends; the GDP per capita on country and NUTS level and
the aggregated weighted GDP per capita of the trade partner all in constant international
US dollars and log; the weighted imports from China and world imports aggregated
over products and the weighted imports from China and world imports of the partners
aggregated over products and partners (all in log); log population at the NUTS level and
time dummies. The lagged value is indicated by L..
as in Eq.(2), except now the individual dimension is the NUTS level and therefore includes
NUTS-specific fixed effects. The control variables again include country-specific time trends
and time dummies.
The results in Table 4 show a significant labor-reallocation effect from the industrial to the
service sector as a consequence of stronger export competition. A look at the magnitude
of the coefficient reveals that the economic effect is substantial. Increasing WEC by 1
percentage point induces a decline in the share of persons employed in the industry sector
of −0.32 percentage points. This translates into a decrease of −1.12 percentage points
when moving from the lowest to the highest quintile in WEC.32 The same shift in WEC
induces a rise in the share of people employed in the service sector of 1.15 percentage
points. The results presented above are robust to the exclusion of the WIC. Thus, as
the Chinese competition in the manufacturing export market increases, the NUTS regions
experience a remarkable change in the employment structure. This result therefore can
be interpreted as an additional source of explanation for the increasing importance of the
service sector. In contrast to previous findings (e.g. Autor and Dorn (2012)) we find that
competition from a low-wage country like China has a considerable effect on the labor
allocation. Within the framework of our theoretical model this result can be interpreted
32The difference in WEC between the 2 quintiles is 3.52 percentage points.
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as the a low-skilled labor being pushed from the better paid manufacturing sector into the
low-wage service sector as a consequence of increased export competition.
Turning to the analysis of wage effects, we first look at the development of the compensation
rates in the industrial and service sector when exposed to Chinese competition. Column
3 shows no significant effect of the WEC on the industry wage rate. This result is robust
to the exclusion of WIC. Hence, the industry-specific effect in Table 3 does not carry over
to the aggregated data. The interpretation along the lines of our theory is that low-skilled
labor elasticity exceeds low-skilled wage elasticity with respect to Chinese competition. As
more low-skilled labor leaves manufacturing, the sector becomes relatively more high-skilled
labor intensive, offsetting the decline in the industry-specific low-skilled wage rate. The
statistically insignificant coefficient in column 3 is therefore compatible with the decrease
in the (low-skilled) manufacturing wage rate found in the previous section as long as low-
skilled and high-skilled industries are distinct.
In the case of the compensation rate in the service sector, we find no evidence of an effect
of WEC. This is not consistent with our theoretical model. A possible explanation is that
productivity systematically differs between workers from the two sectors (Acemoglu and
Autor, 2011). It might be that workers shifting from the industrial to the service sector
are more productive than the average service sector worker, but together with the labor
supply increase, the effects cancel each other.
In line with our theoretical predictions, no significant relationship of the WIC variable with
any dependent parameter listed in Table 4 can be established.
Table 5 provides evidence for the impact of increased import and export competition on
the income and population composition at NUTS level. Again, the all results are regarding
WEC are robust to the exclusion of WIC. Our theoretical model allows us to interpret the
behavior of household income with respect to export competition. However, it cannot be
used to derive qualitative predictions about unemployment or population dynamics.
Column 1 reveals a substantial leverage effect of WEC on real household (HH) GDP per
capita, indicating that the average household member experiences a drop in income due to
Chinese export competition. The coefficient of −1.914 translates into decline in real HH-
GDP per capita of −6.73% when moving from the lowest to the highest quintile in WEC.33
According to the theoretical model, this is a results of the workers shifting from the better
33For the economic magnitude we calculate: average reduction of −1.914 e9.5/100 = −256 euros in pur-
chasing power standards based on final consumption per inhabitant due to an increase in WEC of 1
percentage points.
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paid industrial jobs to the low-wage service sector. This leads to a higher proportion of the
population being employed in the service sector and a drop in average household income.34
Additionally, as can be seen from column 2, an increase in WEC of 1 percentage point
triggers a drop in the employment rate of −0.29 percentage points which further depresses
average per capita income. Thus, there exists a second labor market mechanism which lies
outside the scope of our theoretical model. Apart from entering the service sector, workers
who have left manufacturing may also drop out of employment altogether. With the data
available, we cannot not asses the relative importance of these two mechanisms.35 The
observed unemployment effect could be the caused by labor market frictions, such as the
industry workers not meeting job requirements of the service sector, and hence not being
able to switch to this sector. It might also be the result of the reservation wage being
breached for some workers.
Regarding the effect of WIC, we see that the coefficient is statistically significant in column
1, contradicting the model predictions. However, excluding the WEC from the regression
model renders the coefficient of WIC insignificant. An interpretation therefore is again
difficult. In column 2-4 the coefficient is not statistically significant.
The last column of Table 5 is concerned with the population dynamics at the NUTS level.
Our model does not allow us to derive any predictions regarding this dimension. However,
we expect that the decline in the industry sector, accompanied by the drop in real GDP per
capita together with a worsening outlook for the labor market would motivate emigration.
Indeed, column 3 shows a positive and significant impact of Chinese export competition
on the log of outward migration. The coefficient of 3.209 implies an emigration of 3.2%
when the WEC increases by 1 percentage point. Such a strong effect helps to explain the
withering of regions with a dominating industrial sector that now faces fierce competition
in the export market.
6 Conclusion
The emergence of China as a dominating producer of manufacturing goods raises questions
about the consequences for the industrialized world. Contrary to the existing literature
34As a consequence the functional form of the model also suggest that the wage rate in service drops
which we do not observe in the data.
35Because the labor supply remains elastic,the existence of second mechanism does not influence the
theoretical predictions regarding the manufacturing sector (exports, output and industry structure).
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Table 5: Chinese Competition and Regional Socioeconomic Effects
Dependent Log HH-income Employment Log outwards
Variable: per capita (PPP) rate migration
(1) (2) (3)
L. Weighted export -1.914*** -0.291*** 3.209***
competition (0.377) (0.102) (0.948)
L. Weighted import 0.639** -0.042 0.062
competition (0.290) (0.086) (0.651)
Obs. 2013 2011 684
adj.R2 0.99 0.98 0.99
F-Test 1526.279 210.314 39.917
Notes: Weighting is according to Eq.(6). The individual dimension is the NUTS
level. Robust standard errors clustered at the identifier level in parentheses;*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; FE estimator regressions in all columns with
NUTS-level-specific effects; country-specific time trends; the GDP per capita on
country and NUTS level (except in column 1) and the aggregated weighted GDP
per capita of the trade partner all in constant international US dollars and log; the
weighted imports from China and world imports aggregated over products and
the weighted imports from China and world imports of the partners aggregated
over products and partners (all in log); log population at the NUTS level (except
in column 3) and time dummies. The lagged value is indicated by L..
this study focuses on the analysis of transition costs stemming from changes in the export
market. Using panel data covering several countries at multiple levels of aggregation, we
are able to produce a comprehensive picture of the effects of Chinese export competition.
The construction of an export as well as an import competition measure allows for the
separation of the two channels through which trade with China can affect a (home) country.
By including fixed effects variables and country-specific time trends in all regressions, we
hope to identify effects that are generally valid. Our empirical analysis is guided by a
simple extension of the Melitz-framework which allows us to interpret our results in a
theoretical context.
At the most disaggregated level available, the product level, we find a substantial effect
of increased export competition on the export volume of the OECD countries. The effect
found on the industry level is even stronger. There, the industry-specific output declines
by −20% when moving from the lowest to the highest quintile in our export competi-
tion measure. Within the framework of the theoretical model, these strong effects can be
interpreted as the disintegration of the more productive export sector. The average pro-
ductivity therefore drops along with the wage rate in the manufacturing industries. This
in turn results in a reallocation of labor. Based on the model, we therefore expect Chinese
export competition to affect structural variables within the manufacturing industries. Our
empirical analysis indeed supports these qualitative predictions of the model. We find that
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an increase in Chinese export competition not only induces a decline in the average firm
size, but also leads to a drop in productivity as well as in the industry-specific wage rate.
Moving to the more aggregate regional level, the data analysis shows that regions within
the EU that are exposed to increased Chinese export competition experience a substantial
decline in average household income and are confronted with considerable deindustrial-
ization. This in turn forces more labor into the service sector. The mechanics in our
theoretical model explaining these findings are the following: The wage rate in the man-
ufacturing sector declines and thereby induces reallocation of labor to the service sector.
This in turn causes the service wage rate to decline. These reinforcing effects lead to an
overall decrease in household income. The results regarding inter-sectoral labor realloca-
tion in connection with increased Chinese competition provide an additional explanation
for the continuously increasing share of people employed in the service sector.
Additional insights - outside the scope of the theoretical model - are revealed by the data.
We find that regions facing an intensified Chinese export competition experience a drop in
the employment rate and a surge in outwards migration.
Regarding the effects of direct Chinese import competition, we find mixed results. The
effects found are not always statistically significant and sometimes contradicting our the-
oretical predictions. However, in all the regression settings the coefficient of the measure
for Chinese import competition is substantially smaller than the coefficient for export
competition. Also, the latter explains a higher share within the variation.
Overall, our paper demonstrates two things: First, it stresses the importance of the export
sector in explaining structural changes within and across industries. Second, it shows
that the developed countries are affected in various ways by the emergence of China as
a dominant player on the global market for manufactured goods and are forced to adapt
their production portfolios. Some of the costs associated with this transition process are
analyzed in this study. However, implications for total welfare can not be derived. This
constitutes an interesting aspect for future research.
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Appendices
A The Theoretical Model
In this section, we present a simple extension of the Melitz Model (Melitz, 2003) and its
generalization in Arkolakis et al. (2008) presented in Redding (2010). The model embeds
our empirical analysis in the theoretical trade literature and provides us with qualitative
predictions regarding the implications of increased Chinese (export) competition for the
OECD economies. More precisely, we are interested in analyzing how the increased com-
petition affects the export volume and the total output of the manufacturing sector and
how these changes influence structural variables within and across sectors. We therefore
have to equip the model with a sufficiently sophisticated structure to achieve these goals.
The model is specifically designed to analyze the impact of China - a country standing
apart from the rest of the world due to its sheer size36 and its state-regulated37 economy -
on the developed countries. It therefore by no means claims generality.
A.1 Setup
There are two representative OECD countries38: Home and Foreign denoted with the
subscripts H and F , respectively.39 These countries exhibit similar consumption and pro-
duction patterns but may differ in size and prevailing wage rates. On the production side,
the OECD economies consist of:
• a Walrasian service sector producing a non-tradable homogeneous good,
• a manufacturing sector, producing a single differentiable and tradable good according
to the Melitz type definitions (heterogeneous firm productivities),
• a Walrasian high-tech sector producing a tradable homogeneous good.
Both the manufacturing and the high-tech good are assumed to belong class of industrial
products.
36With the exception of India.
37Including its export oriented policies.
38Extending the model to multiple countries is easily done. However, no additional insight is gained.
39The terms ’Foreign’ and ’Trade Partner’ are used interchangeably.
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On the labor market, we find a pool of low-skilled workers with mass L¯ and a pool of
high-skilled workers with mass LT . The tasks in the high-tech sector require high-skilled
labor. Since we assume that the high-tech sector pays the highest wages and do not allow
an upgrade from low-skilled to high-skilled, the high-tech sector is closed and employs all
high-skilled workers.
Tasks in the service sector can be performed by all low-skilled workers, whereas the entry
into the manufacturing sector is associated with a fixed cost to qualify (upgrade) for the
tasks of the manufacturing sector. The low-skilled workers are heterogeneous in terms of
this fixed cost.40 By assuming that the upgrade cost is positive, we find that wages in
manufacturing are higher than in service. As a result, a shift in labor between the service
and the manufacturing sector is observed at the margin of the cut-off fixed cost, as the
relative wage rate between the sectors changes.
The OECD countries consume services and the varieties of the manufacturing good while
exporting the manufacturing varieties to each other. However, for reasons of simplicity
and tractability, they fo not consume the high-tech good.41
Since we are interested in analyzing the effects within the OECD countries, we endow China
solely with a manufacturing sector which exports varieties of the manufacturing good to
the OECD countries. Therefore, China creates competition in these markets, but does not
import the manufacturing good from either Home or Foreign.42 On the other hand, China
imports the high-tech good from both of the OECD countries. The one-way trade of the
high-tech good allows for a positive trade balance, implying that the OECD countries pay
their imports of the manufacturing good from China with high-tech products. Through
these assumptions we fix Chinese exports to the Chinese high-tech imports, thus making
the competition from China in the manufacturing sector exogenous. It follows that Chinese
manufacturing characteristics are exogenous with respect to those in Home and Foreign.
Considering the sustainably low level of Chinese wages (Ceglowski and Golub, 2011) and
the export volume that is influenced by state interventions43 the assumption of exogeneity
is quite realistic.
40The fixed costs capture, for example, the notion of some learning ability.
41An economic argument for this simplification is that the high-tech product sold to China has to be
adapted to the Chinese market in such a way that it is not possible to sell it domestically. In this case, we
could allow for the consumption of a domestic high-tech product and a Chinese market high-tech product
without affecting the model results or the tractability.
42This strong assumption is plausible in the light of the (still) heavily protected Chinese consumer
market.
43E.g., the exchange rate regime.
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The simplifications described above allow us to obtain an analytical solution as well as to
break the symmetry imposed by the trade balance condition in the case of a single good.
Subsequently, we focus on the description and analysis of the home country.
A.2 Demand
Consumers in the OECD countries derive utility according to an upper tier logarithmic
function and a CES sub-utility function over the manufacturing varieties j in the set Ω:
Ui = β ln(Si) + α ln(Mi) where
(
Mi =
∫
Ω
q(j)
σ−1
σ
i dj
) σ
σ−1
and i = H,F (8)
where S and M are the measures for the service good and the manufacturing good con-
sumption, respectively; q(j)i is the quantity consumed of variety j; σ > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution and α + β = 1 are the expenditure shares. Total income is given by:
Yi = L
S
i ri + L
M
i wi + L
T
i hi, where ri < wi < hi are the wage rates and LS , LM , LT are the
labor masses in service, manufacturing and high-tech in country i respectively. The ex-
penditure structure is given by Eq. (9), where for notational ease, the country index is
dropped.
E(S) = Y
β
α+ β
= Y β, E(M) = Y
α
α+ β
= Y α, with q(j) = E(M)
(
p(j)
P
)−σ
, (9)
with E(S) and E(M) = M × P are the expenditure for the service and the manufacturing
good, respectively; P is the price index for the manufacturing good; and q(j) is the demand
for a representative variety in the manufacturing sector.
For the high-tech sector, we assume that each OECD country produces a single distinct
good which is exclusively sold to China. Hence, the entire high-tech good output is exported
to China. Further, we assume that the high-skilled labor force in Home and Foreign is of
equal size. LC wC γH is the Chinese expenditure share for the high-tech good of Home,
where we assume γ = γH = γF . Thus, we can treat the wage rate in the high-tech sector,
both in Home and Foreign, as numeraire and set h = 1. LC wC γ also fixes the trade
balance between Home (Foreign) and China. This implies that the manufacturing export
volume of China is independent of the market mechanisms in the manufacturing sector of
Home and Foreign.
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A.3 Low-skilled Labor Allocation
Low-skilled workers of aggregate mass L¯ = LS + LM , select themselves into the service
sector, earning wage rate r, or the manufacturing receiving wage w. While entry into the
service sector comes at no cost, entering into the manufacturing sector is costly. Each low-
skilled worker is associated with a unique fixed cost aθ which depends on a latent ability θ,
uniformly distributed across [0, u]. This implies an elastic labor supply for the service and
the manufacturing sector, which is governed by the cut-off fixed cost θ¯ = aw−r . The labor
supply in the two sectors is given by:
LS = min{L¯, AL¯
w − r} and L
M = max{L¯− AL¯
w − r , 0} with L¯ = L
S + LM , A =
a
u
(10)
where we restrict the analysis to interior solutions. Due to the static nature of our
model and because each worker perceives the wage rates as given, in equilibrium there is
no incentive for any worker to change from service to manufacturing or vice versa. Eq.
(10) also implies that w > r + A. Otherwise, no worker will pay the fixed costs. Hence,
production in manufacturing requires at least a wage premium A in order to attract the
worker with the lowest upgrade costs, i.e. the most suited worker for manufacturing.
As the manufacturing labor force expands, the wage premium has to increase along the
upgrade-cost distribution of the low-skilled labor force.
A.4 Production in the Service Sector
The service sector employs low-skilled service labor LS and produces a homogeneous good
with technology yS = pS qS − qS r where qS is the quantity produced and pS is the selling
price. The CRS-technology implies pS = r. Using the demand for services from Eq. (9),
the country GDP and the wage rate in the service sector can be written as:
Y =(−A L¯+ LT + L¯ w)
r =
A L¯w
A (β − 1)L¯− β(LT + L¯ w) + w
(11)
A.5 Production in the Manufacturing Sector
The fundamental part of the model is the manufacturing sector. All the effects analyzed
will stem from Chinese competition within this sector at home and abroad. We assume
that the OECD countries are symmetric, but allow for differences in low-skilled labor force
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and wage rates w and r.44
Technology in the manufacturing sector is the same for each country. We assume that each
firms draws its labor productivity φ from a Pareto distribution with parameter k > σ − 1
and support [1,∞) paying a sunk fixed cost fe. Production requires the investment of fixed
cost f . In case the firms decide to export, they incur an additional fixed export market
entry cost fX , which is due in the foreign country. We further assume that trade is costly
and exhibits iceberg transport costs τ > 1 which are symmetric between Home and Foreign.
Given the cost function of an exporting firm in the home country cXH(q) =
wH τ
φ q + fX and
the demand in Eq. (9) the equilibrium pricing, output and profit conditions yield:
pH(φ) =
wH
ρ φ
, pXH(φ) =
τ wH
ρ φ
qH(φ) = E(M)H P
σ−1
H
(
wH
ρ φ
)−σ
, qXH (φ) = RF P
σ−1
F τ
(
wH τ
ρ φ
)−σ
µH(φ) =
rH(φ)
σ
− f wH , µXH(φ) =
rXH (φ)
σ
− fX wF
(12)
where superscriptX denotes the export case: µH(φ) and rH(φ) are the profits and revenues,
respectively; PH and E(M)H are the price index in Home and the expenditure of Home
on the manufacturing good respectively; and ρ = σσ−1 is the mark-up. The profit functions
together with the demand in Eq. (9) yield the following cut-off productivities:45
(
φ¯H
)σ−1
=
f σ P 1−σH ρ
1−σ wσH
α (−A L¯H + LTH + L¯H wH)(
φ¯XH
)σ−1
=
fX σ wF P
1−σ
F ρ
1−σ τσ−1 wσ−1H
α (−A L¯F + LTF + L¯F wF )
(13)
(
φ¯XCH
)σ−1
=
fX τ
σ−1
CH
(
φ¯H
)σ−1
wσ−1C w
1−σ
H
f
where
(
φ¯XCH
)
is the cut-off productivity of Chinese firms exporting to Home. τCH are
the iceberg costs for exporting from China C to Home H. Thus, firms with productivity
φ < φ¯H will not start production at all, whereas firms with productivity φ¯H < φ < φ¯XH serve
only the domestic market, but do not export to Foreign. We assume φ¯XH > φ¯H from here
on. By symmetry, the above conditions are analogous for the foreign country. Next, the
free entry condition µ¯
(
φ¯H
)−k
= fewH , with µ¯ denoting average profits, can be written as
fe
(
φ¯H
)k − f(σ − 1)
k − σ + 1 =
fX(σ − 1)wF
(
φ¯H
)k (
φ¯XH
)−k
wH(k − σ + 1) . (14)
The price index of the manufacturing good, where Ni are the number of active firms, is
44We do not solve for the endogenous Chinese variables here. Given the setup of the model this could
be easily done. Because these variables are uncoupled from factors in the manufacturing sector of Home
and Foreign, they do not influence the results, however.
45Setting µ(φ¯) = 0.
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defined as:
P 1−σH =
k ρσ−1
k − σ + 1
∑
i,j
Ni
(
φ¯i
φ¯Xj
)k(
τijwi
φ¯Xj
)1−σ
where i, j = H,F,C (15)
Using the cut-off conditions, the price index and the free-entry condition, the manufac-
turing labor market clearing, yields the following expression:
NH =
ρ
(
φ¯H
)−k
fe k wH
(
E(M)H − L
T k
(k + 1)ρ
)
=
ρ
(
φ¯H
)−k
fe k wH
(
α L¯H(wH −A) + LT
(
α− k
(k + 1)ρ
))
. (16)
Under the assumptions that China does not import the manufacturing good and that
the high-tech goods of Home and Foreign are distinct, and additionally having fixed the
Chinese demand for the high-tech good as a share of Chinese income, we can write the
trade balance between China and Home as:
LC wC γ = L
T = NC
(
φ¯C
)k (
φ¯XCH
)−k∫
φ¯XCH
k E(M)H φ
−k−1 (φ¯XCH)k Pσ−1H (τCH wCρ φ
)1−σ
dφ. (17)
Next, we define our measures for Chinese competition in the domestic and the export
market in terms of the shares of total consumption of Chinese products in Home and
Foreign:
vci =
XCi
α
(−A L¯i + LTi + L¯i wi) = LC wC γα (−A L¯i + LTi + L¯i wi) where i = H,F (18)
where XCi is the export value from China to Home (Foreign). The denominator represents
the income share spent on manufacturing goods. Because the high-tech good is exclusively
sold to China we can directly link the high-tech demand to the share of imports from
China. From Eq. (18) we can see that the only free variable, wi, governs vci. Since we
have fixed the demand for the high-tech product, this implies that an increase of vci is
automatically associated with a decline in the manufacturing sector relative to the high-
tech sector. Hence, a rise in vci is only possible if wi decreases. This in turn implies a
contraction of the manufacturing labor force as a result of the elastic labor supply in Eq.
(10).
The conditions in Eqs. (17)-(18), together with the assumption that LT = LC wC γ for
both Home and Foreign, allow us to write the wage rate in Home and Foreign as a function
of the respective shares of imports from China:
wH = A+
γ LC wC − α LT vcH
α L¯H vcH
= A+
γ LC wC
L¯H
(
1
α vcH
− 1
)
(19)
which defines the wage rate as a function of the share of imports from China in the
domestic market. In order to get an expression for the wage rate hinging on the export
market share, vcF , we plug Eqs. (13) - (16) into the definition of the share of imports from
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China of Foreign in Eq. (18), solve for w1+kH , and plug the solution into the Home trade
balance in Eq. (17). Solving for the wage rate wH and substituting for wF using Eq. (19)
results in:
wH = A−
XFH
(
τ2k
(
fX
f
) 2k
σ−1−2 − 1
)
α L¯H︸ ︷︷ ︸
return effect
+
γ LC(1− vcF )wC
(
τ τCH
τCF
)k (
fX
f
) k
σ−1−1
α L¯H vcF︸ ︷︷ ︸
competition effect
+
(1− α)γ LC wC
α L¯H
.
(20)
Here XFH are the imports of H from F and are defined as:
XFH =
γ2L2C
(
τCF
τ
)k
wk+2C
(
φ¯C
)−k
(k(σ − σ vcF − 1) + σ − 1)
(
A+ γ LC wC(1−α) vcF
α L¯F vcF
)−k−1
fek(k + 1)NCσ vcF
. (21)
In order to ensure a positive trade volume between Home and Foreign, we have to restrict
vcF to the interval (0, (k+1)(σ−1)kσ ). This is necessary to avoid a prohibitive manufacturing
wage rate in Home as vcF → 0.46 At the other extreme, as vcF → (k+1)(σ−1)kσ , the Chinese
competition in Foreign is too strong, resulting in a wage rate wF which does not attract
enough labor for production in Foreign to allow for a positive trade balance between Home
and Foreign.47
The Chinese competition in the export market affects the wage rate in Home wH through
two channels. First, there is the direct competition effect in the export market, consti-
tuting is a pure crowding out effect.48 Second, there is an indirect ’return-effect’, which
arises because the Chinese import competition in the export market, vcF , also affects the
export volume of the trading partner, XFH , and thereby the firm structure of the foreign
export sector. It is shown in Appendix A.9.1 that the marginal change in the wage rate
with respect to both, vcH and vcF , is strictly negative on (0, (k+1)(σ−1)kσ ), but not constant
due to these opposite effects. Further, Appendix A.9.1 shows that the competition effect
dominates the return effect in absolute value.
Using the first equality in Eq. (18) and the export volume XHF = XFH of Home allows us
to write the total sales in the domestic-market as
XHH = XHF
(
fX
f
) k
σ−1−1(τ τCH
τCF
)k
. (22)
46Note that the wage rate wF has to move towards infinity as China’s trade share in Foreign tends
towards zero (vcF → 0). Hence, no firm will pay the sunk cost in order to enter the manufacturing export
market.
47In fact, it does not allow for manufacturing production in Foreign at all.
48The competition-effect also depends on some remoteness parameter, as described in (Chaney, 2008).
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The equation states that the domestic sales are proportional to the export volume. Thus,
to discuss total manufacturing output, it suffices to analyze the behavior of the export
volume. The argument for domestic sales follows immidiately. Hence, we have specified
the endogenous variables in terms of the respective share of imports from China in the
domestic- and export market.
A.6 Model Caveat and Restrictions
Before proceeding to the discussion of the different effects of increased Chinese competition
on the wage rate, we have to discuss a caveat of the model.
As pointed out in Eqs. (21)-(22), production in Home becomes zero, as either vcF → 0
or vcH → 0. This stems from a prohibitive wage rate, since in both cases wH → ∞ and
wF → ∞ (Eqs. (19)-(20)), which is an implication of the fixed Chinese export volume in
Eq. (17).49 The relevant model-mechanism can best be illustrated by evaluating the cut-off
productivities. Using α vcH(−A L¯H + γ LC wC + L¯H wH) = γ LC wC and the definition of
the price index, we obtain:
(
φ¯H
)k
=
(
f
fX
) k
σ−1−1
f k σ wk+1H τ
−k
CH NC w
−k−1
C
(
φ¯C
)k
γ LC (k − σ + 1) (23)
and (
φ¯XH
)k
=
fX k σ w
k
H wF
(
τ
τCF
)k
w−k−1C NC
(
φ¯C
)k
γ LC (k − σ + 1) , (24)
where we assume wF
(
τ
τCF
)k
> wH τ
−k
CH
(
f
fX
) k
σ−1 to assure that not all active firms
export. Both cut-off productivities are positively related to wH and wF , since the export
fixed costs have to be paid in Foreign. In particular, a (positive) one-to-one relationship
exists between the wage rates, cut-off productivities and the expenditure.50 Thus, when
we analyze the behavior of the wage rate, the behavior of the latter two follow. Now,
both cut-off productivities51 move towards infinity when either vcF → 0 or vcH → 0. This
requires that the expected profits for firm entry also move towards infinity. That is indeed
the case, since expenditure on the manufacturing good moves towards infinity as wH →∞,
to ensure that the income share spend on Chinese products approaches 0. As a result, we
49Thus, the only adjustable variable, is the wage rate.
50As the wage rate decreases ⇒ profits rise ⇒ labor demand for entry costs, fe, rises ⇒ wage rate rises.
Thus, in order to break this chain and induce the wage rate to fall, we require the cut-off productivities
to fall and thereby average productivity to fall.
51Note, that the cut-off productivities governs average productivity.
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find that all labor is used on the fixed entry costs fe, but no production takes place, since
no firm pays the fixed costs of production f . Appendix A.9.1 shows that the wage rate
is inversely related to vci. Hence, as these shares increase away from zero, the wage rate
and therefore, both, expenditure and cut-off productivities fall and production starts (Eq.
(22)). Simultaneously, the trade volume between Home and Foreign increases (Eq. (21)).
We know from Eq. (10) that as the wage rate declines, manufacturing labor contracts,
implying that manufacturing labor is at its peak at vci = 0. As the shares vci increase,
additional firms become active52 (φ > φ¯H) and more labor is used on production relative
to entry costs because the expected profits decrease simultaneously. Nevertheless, total
manufacturing labor demand declines and hence the manufacturing labor force steadily
decreases.
Along with the wage rate decline, total income is reduced (one-to-one relation) and hence
the expenditure share on OECD manufacturing goods decreases (Chinese export volume
is fixed). Thus, we have (a) a cut-off productivity effect, allowing more firms to produce
(labor used on entry costs declines in relative terms) and (b) an expenditure/labor effect
which decreases spending and the available labor force. These are two opposite forces
working on the manufacturing output.53 Figure 3 depicts a numerical example for the
relevant function with respect to the export competition measure vcF .
Starting at vcF = 0, at first the positive effect (relatively more labor in production) is
dominant and production and exports increase. This means the elasticity of the cut-off
productivity exceeds the labor supply elasticity despite the expenditure decline, preventing
labor shortage. That is, the absolute value of the marginal change in labor reallocation
(within manufacturing) from entry costs to production exceeds the absolute value of the
marginal change in labor reallocation from the manufacturing to the service sector (which
is equivalent to the manufacturing labor demand decline). Finally, as we continue to
increase vcF , we move along the interval (0, (k+1)(σ−1)kσ ) to the right, and the labor contraction
becomes noticeable and prevails at vc∗F ∈ (0, (k+1)(σ−1)kσ ). From this point on, the wage rate
contraction leads to a drop in total output as more and more varieties are forced out of
the market. These varieties vanish from the market because income declines along with
the wage rate, resulting in a smaller expenditure spent on the manufacturing goods of
the OECD countries H and F in addition to the labor supply decrease. This cannot any
52Additionally, due to the Pareto distribution, a fixed share also enters the export market (φ > φ¯XH).
53Note, since exports and domestic sales are proportional to total output, it is sufficient to discuss total
output.
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Figure 3: Functional Form
vcF
*
vcF
LHM-labor manufacturing
wF-wage rate in Foreign
wH-wage rate in Home
XFH-export volume
Note: The figure presents a numerical example of the respective functions. The graphs of the functions are scaled
such that they can be represented in the same graphic. Thus, the relative magnitude is not preserved.
longer be compensated by movements in the cut-off productivities. Finally, at (k+1)(σ−1)kσ
production in the OECD ceases again, resulting in a zero trade balance between Home
and Foreign. At (k+1)(σ−1)kσ all manufacturing labor is used by Chinese firms which have
to pay their export fixed costs in the export market. At this point the wage rate is
constant because we have fixed the export volume of Chinese manufacturing varieties and
all manufacturing expenditure goes to Chinese firms. Appendix A.9.2 shows that vc∗F is
unique. The argument in the case of vc∗H then follows immediately.
From here on, we restrict our model to the interval vci ∈ (vc∗i , (k+1)(σ−1)kσ ) in order to avoid
economically conflicting effects due to the functional form, in particular, the fixed Chinese
trade balance of the model. This restriction is supported by the data which document
existing intra-industry trade among OECD countries and further suggests a declining trade
volume induced by Chinese competition.
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A.7 Qualitative Analysis
Using the results above, we now derive qualitative predictions for the impact of increased
Chinese competition on the export volume as well as structural variables within the manu-
facturing sector. We additionally analyze if these changes can result in inter-sectoral labor
reallocations and alterations of average income. Since all the effects in the model are driven
by changes in the wage rate of the manufacturing sector, we start by analyzing how an
increase in the share of imports from China will affect the wage rate wH . As discussed
above, we restrict the model analyses to (vc∗i ,
(k+1)(σ−1)
kσ ).
A.7.1 Chinese Competition and the Manufacturing Wage Rate
From the setup of the labor market, we know that A is the minimum wage premium in man-
ufacturing that has to be paid in order to attract the worker with the lowest upgrade costs
from the service sector. Looking at Eq. (19) reveals that the wage rate in manufacturing
can be written as a mark-up over that minimum wage premium. Thus, as manufacturing
labor demand increases, firms need to pay higher mark-ups in order to attract labor along
the upgrade cost distribution.
The first equality of Eq. (19) can be written as E(M)H vcH = α vcH(LH(wH − A) + LT ) =
γ LC wC . The equality states that the expenditure on the Chinese manufacturing good
must correspond to the export value from the high-tech good in the trade balance. Thus,
as we increase the fraction of income spent on the Chinese product, the wage mark-up
decreases under the trade balance constraint as the manufacturing labor demand in Home
has to decline.
We are particularly interested in the effect of changes in the share of imports from China
in Foreign, vcF , on the wage rate in Home, wH . From Eqs. (20) -(21), we see that the
competition-effect has an unambiguously harmful impact on the wage rate. As demon-
strated in Appendix A.9.1, the return-effect term in Eq. (20) is dominated by the com-
petition effect. Therefore, wH declines as vcF increases. Note however, that there are
two opposite forces in the foreign manufacturing market acting through vcF on the wage
rate. First of all, an increase in vcF leads to a stronger competition-effect reducing wH , as
the export sector declines and average productivity in Home and manufacturing output is
reduced (reversed Melitz effect). Thus, the competition-effect works through the export
sector of Home and is a result of a lower average productivity. More specifically, as the
export market sales decline, the more productive export firms lay off labor and wage rate
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decreases, allowing low productivity firms to enter the manufacturing market. The impact
on average productivity is even amplified as the fixed costs of exporting decline, resulting
in a decreasing average productivity of the exporting firms.54 Second, an increase in the
share of imports from Chinain Foreign, vcF , has the opposite effect55 on the exports from
Foreign to Home (return-effect) and hence by the trade balance also on the exports from
Home to Foreign. Note, that the return-effect emerges solely due to the interaction of the
foreign manufacturing sector with the share of imports from China in the foreign market.
Hence, the return-effect affects the manufacturing sector in Home only indirectly through
the foreign export sector. An increase in vcF additionally, leads to a displacement of foreign
varieties by Chinese manufacturing products. This is not, however, an export competition
effect, but a labor market (income) effect. In particular, as the wage rate wF decreases,
less labor is available to foreign firms, because labor relocates to the service sector. This
in turn reduces foreign production and hence the exports from Foreign to Home, as more
and more varieties of Foreign are forced out of the market. This mechanism reduces the
pressure from foreign firms on the domestic market in H. Thus, we find that competition
from Foreign also affects firms that only serve the domestic market in H.
Summing up, we find that the competition-effect has a negative effect on the wage rate
wH through the export sector, but the return-effect has a positive effect on wH , since the
competition from Foreign is reduced. However, the competition effect prevails. Rephrased,
the model mechanisms imply that the prospering of the high-tech sector (vci increases) is
fueled at the cost of the manufacturing sector.
A.7.2 Chinese Competition and the Export Volume
We now look at the marginal change of the export volume from Home to Foreign, XHF ,
caused by a rise in Chinese competition in the domestic (vcH ↑) or the export market
(vcF ↑). In the light of the discussion in the previous subsection this is straightforward.
The export volume can be written in terms of the wage rate wH , where the first inequality
holds by assumption of an equalized trade balance,
XHF = XFH =
γ LC w
k+1
C w
−k−1
F
(
φ¯C
)−k ( τCH
τ
)k
((k + 1)(σ − 1)E(M)F − γ k LC σ wC)
fek(k + 1)NC σ
(25)
54It is then not exactly a reversed Melitz effect, since we observe a decreasing export cut-off and a
decreasing export volume in vcF . This happens if the entry cut-off decreases faster and the number of
active firms decline or either of these two.
55Remember that we restrict the shares to vci ∈ (vc∗i , (k+1)(σ−1)kσ )
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where E(M)F = (−A L¯F + LT + L¯F wF )α and we know that on vcF ∈ (vc∗F , (k+1)(σ−1)kσ )
∂XFH
∂vcF
< 0 and by the chain rule ∂XHF
∂wF
=
∂XFH
∂wF
=
∂XFH
∂vcF
∂wF
∂vcF
. (26)
Since ∂wF∂vcF is negative, we conclude that the income effect in Eq. (26), through E(M)F ,
w.r.t. wF , dominates the effect through w−k−1F (export fix costs) and we find
∂XHF
∂wF
> 0 on
vcF ∈ (vc∗F , (k+1)(σ−1)kσ ).
A.7.3 Chinese Competition and the Manufacturing Output
We have already established that the domestic sales contract proportionally to the export
volume in the case of increased export competition vcF . Given the equalized trade bal-
ance, Eqs. (26)-(22) also imply ∂(XHH+XHF )∂vcF <
∂XHF
∂vcF
< 0 on vcF ∈ (vc∗F , (k+1)(σ−1)kσ ). Thus,
increased Chinese export competition leads to a decline in total output in Home. Addi-
tionally, the model suggests that the contraction in total output exceeds the contraction
in the export volume, since both domestic and export sales are affected.
A.7.4 Chinese Competition and the Number of Active Firms
There are two opposite effects which determine the number of firms. First, the lower cut-off
productivities increase the probability of a firm becoming active. In addition, the reduction
in average productivity in the market decreases the mean firm size, allowing more firms to
operate. On the other hand, the lower wage rate which is accompanied by an increase in
Chinese competition reduces available manufacturing labor, as workers shift to the service
sector. Thus, the overall effect of increased Chinese competition is ambiguous. Formally,
the number of active firms can be expressed as
NH =
XHF f (k − σ + 1)
(
fX
f
) k
σ−1−1 ( τ τCH
τCF
)k
k σ wH
(27)
where Eq. (27), under the assumption of an equalized trade balance XHF = XFH , implies
that the direction of the change in the number of firms with respect to vcF depends on the
magnitude of the respective derivatives of ∂wH∂vcF and
∂XFH
∂vcF
(both being negative).
A.8 Chinese Competition and Socioeconomic Effects
In this subsection, we examine the effects of increased Chinese competition on the overall
economy, in particular the average income and the labor allocation. We restrict the analysis
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to the case where competition increases in the export market. The effects of intensified
Chinese competition in the domestic market can be derived analogously.
A.8.1 Chinese Competition and the Labor Allocation
Since there exists a one-to-one relationship between the wage rate and the size of the labor
force in service and manufacturing respectively, the analysis is straightforward. An in-
crease in Chinese competition on the interval vcF ∈ (vc∗F , (k+1)(σ−1)kσ ), leads to a reallocation
from manufacturing to the lower-wage service sector. This is a result of worker hetero-
geneity with respect to the upgrade cost. As the wage rate wH declines, fewer low-skilled
workers are attracted to the manufacturing sector, since their fixed costs of entering the
manufacturing sector increase along the upgrade-cost distribution. Thus, we find a con-
tracting manufacturing labor force and an expanding service-sector labor force as a result
of increased export competition vcF .
A.8.2 Chinese Competition and the Service Sector Wage Rate, Total Average
Income
A decrease in manufacturing wage rate wH , due to a rise in export competition, vcF ,
induces an increase in labor supply in the service sector. As a result the service wage rate
rH drops. This is an implication of Eq. (11). From that it follows that the overall impact
of the increased export competition on the total income of low-skilled labor is composed
of three reinforcing effects. First, the wage rate of manufacturing labor declines. Second,
the wage rate of the service sector decreases as well. Third, labor reallocates from the
better paid manufacturing sector to the low-wage service sector. Put together, the export
competition has a negative effect on the total income. However, since we assume that
both, the high-tech good and the manufacturing good are classified as industrial goods
it is possible that the overall wage rate per industrial labor unit hH L
T
H+wH L
M
H
LMH +L
T
H
increases.
This is the case when the labor supply elasticity is high, implying that the proportion of
high-skilled workers in the industrial sector significantly increases.
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A.9 Proofs
A.9.1 Proof 1
Proof that the competition-effect dominates the return-effect and that the wage rate is
inversely related to the export competition measure. Write Eq. (20) as
αYH = vcH α YH −XFH
(
τ2k
(
fX
f
) 2k
σ−1−2
− 1
)
+
γ LC(1− vcF )wC
(
τ τCH
τCF
)k (
fX
f
) k
σ−1−1
vcF
, (28)
where we used the fact that LC wC γ = E(M)H vcH = YH α vcH and the definition of income
in Eq. (11). Hence, as we require that YH α ≥ YH α vcH , the Proof of part 1 follows. Taking
the derivatives w.r.t. vcF and substituting
γ LC (1−vcF ) wC
(
fX
f
) k
σ−1−1( τ τCH
τCF
)k
vcF
= A1 > B1 =
XFH
(
τ2k
(
fX
f
) 2k
σ−1−2 − 1
)
, Eq. (28) also implies
∂wH
∂vcF
= −
B1 vcF
∂XFH
∂vcF
XFH
+ A11−vcF
α LF (1− vcH)vcF , (29)
where the restriction XFH > 0⇒
∂XFH
∂vcF
XFH
> −1 and hence implies ∂wH∂vcF < 0.
A.9.2 Proof 2
Proof that vc∗F ∈ (0, (k+1)(σ−1)kσ ) exists and is unique. Setting the first-order derivative of
Eq. (21) to zero, and solving for vcF yields
vc∗F =
γ k LC(σ − 1)wC
α A LF (σ − 1) + γ LC wC(−σ α+ α+ k σ) (30)
which can be shown to lie within the interval (0, (k+1)(σ−1)kσ ). Additionally, we know that
∂XFH
∂vcF
> 0 ∀ vcF ∈ (0, vc∗F ) and ∂XFH∂vcF < 0 ∀ vcF ∈ (vc∗F ,
(k+1)(σ−1)
kσ ) which concludes the proof.
B Constructing Correspondence Tables
B.1 Matching HS Codes into the UN Industry Classification
Accompanying the industry-specific output data, the UN provides a correspondence table
for the UN industry and the HS classifications. Using this table we assign the four-digit
HS codes to the six-digit UN industry classifications. 41 percent of the HS codes cannot
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be uniquely assigned to an industry. These industries and their corresponding outputs are
aggregated into new industries.56 Proceeding in this manner, of the 569 original industry
codes, 233 were merged into 76 new industries. In over 70 percent of the cases, fewer than
4 industry codes had to be merged. The maximum number of codes combined is 14, the
average being 3.1. A table depicting which codes were merged to new industries is available
upon request. Since we control for country-industry fixed effects, we do not expect any
problems arising from this aggregation procedure, as the classification remains constant.
B.2 Matching HS Codes into the Eurostat Industry Classification
The matching of the HS codes into the NACE classification is more troublesome than
the procedure described above. Firstly, no single correspondence table exists relating the
NACE classification to the HS codes. However, a table can be constructed using the corre-
spondence between the HS classification and the ISIC (Rev 3.1) notation together with the
table linking the ISIC classification to the NACE industries. Both these tables are available
from the UN classifications registry homepage.57 Secondly, were the approach described in
Section B.1 to be used, the number of resulting industries - and thus observations available
for the empirical analysis - would be very low, with each industry encompassing a large
number of HS codes. This is due to a number of the HS codes spreading over various
industries. Through these codes, a lot of industries are intertwined, implying the need for
a considerable aggregation. This problem becomes more pronounced, the more digits are
included in the industry classification. Even at the two-digit level, multiple assignments
still exist. However, the number of HS codes creating the problem is relatively low (32
codes, representing 3 percent of the total58). Dropping these codes allows for an exact
matching of the remaining HS codes into the original two-digit NACE classification. By
excluding the codes, we ignore a certain amount of trade that has actually been reported.
Therefore, the results presented in Sections 5.4 to 5.5 can be regarded as the effects when
trade is at its lower bound. In order to check whether the method of creating the corre-
spondence critically affects the results, we employ a different method for the construction
56A newly defined industry includes all the original industries associated with the HS code that matches
into multiple industries. If other HS codes correspond to one of the industries affected, the correspondence
table has to be adapted accordingly. In doing so, one has to take into account the possibility that one
of these HS codes may also not be uniquely assignable. In this case, the new industry definition has to
encompass these additional industries.
57http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/
58A table listing the industries together with the omitted codes originally assigned to them are available
from the authors.
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of the correspondence table. In contrast to Section B.2 we do not drop the HS codes that
cannot be assigned to a single industry. Instead, we assign the trade volume reported for
such a HS code to all the industries over which it spans. This multiple assignment creates
more trade volume than originally reported by the Comtrade Database. The effects found
in the empirical analysis using this correspondence table can therefore be interpreted as
the impact when trade is at its upper bound.
First, we construct the explanatory variables using the new correspondence table for the
matching process. When we compare the variables to the regressors used in the main part,
we find that the correlation coefficient exceeds 0.99 for all the variables. On these grounds,
we do not expect the results to change significantly. Indeed, when re-running the regressions
of Sections 5.4 -5.5, we find that the results for the coefficients of the weighted export
competition and the weighted import competition measures are qualitatively equivalent.
Quantitatively, the effects are also very similar. The output tables of the alternative
approach are available from the authors upon request.
C Descriptive Statistics
Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics Product-Level Dataset
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. N.Obs. Source
Log bilateral exports 11.38 3.05 0.00 24.53 12424602
Comtrade
Export competition 0.12 0.18 0.00 1.00 12424602
Import competition 0.11 0.17 0.00 1.00 12424602
Log imports from China of home country 14.55 2.92 0.00 24.62 12424602
Log total imports of home country 18.25 1.88 4.80 25.65 12424602
Log imports from China of partner country 16.47 2.35 0.00 25.65 12424602
Log total imports of partner country 112.91 3.05 0.00 24.62 12424602
Log GDP p. capita of home country 10.20 0.34 8.89 10.81 10596365 WDILog GDP p. capita of partner country 9.41 1.04 5.22 11.21 10431524
WDI: World Development Index
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Table C.2: Descriptive Statistics UN-Industry-Level Dataset
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. N.Obs. Source
Log industry output 3.06 3.16 -10.62 12.60 31293 UN Stat
Weighted export competition 0.10 0.13 0.00 1.00 37616
Comtrade
Weighted import substitution 0.09 0.15 0.00 1.00 37616
Log imports from China of home country 14.20 3.13 0.69 24.58 37616
Log total imports of home country 18.28 1.78 6.95 24.67 37616
Log imports from China of export markets 19.24 2.32 3.22 26.03 37616
Log total imports of export markets 22.24 1.62 7.06 28.11 37616
Log GDP p. capita of home country 10.11 0.35 9.21 10.78 37616 WDILog GDP p. capita of export markets 9.86 0.23 7.25 10.85 37616
UN Stat: UN Industrial Commodity Production Statistics Database
WDI: World Development Index
Table C.3: Descriptive Statistics Eurostat-Industry-Level Dataset
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. N.Obs. Source
Log compensation per employee 3.23 0.73 -0.22 4.90 4241
Eurostat
Log employment in industry 10.41 1.42 2.64 13.95 4337
Apparent labor productivity 63.18 461.54 -76.70 23694.10 4070
Log employees per firm 3.13 1.04 -1.84 7.84 4337
Log number of enterprises 3.13 1.04 -1.84 7.84 4337
Weighted export competition 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.44 5318
Comtrade
Weighted import competition 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.48 5318
Log imports from China of home country 17.76 2.30 5.49 23.25 5318
Log total imports of home country 18.44 1.46 13.79 23.26 5318
Log imports from China of export markets 22.77 1.70 8.18 25.98 5318
Log total imports of export markets 25.49 1.09 18.83 27.90 5318
Log GDP p. capita of home country 10.15 0.35 9.10 10.81 5318 WDILog GDP p. capita of export markets 9.92 0.16 9.28 10.50 5318
WDI: World Development Index
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Table C.4: Descriptive Statistics Regional-Level Dataset
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. N.Obs. Source
Industrial labor share 0.21 0.08 0.01 0.42 2241
Eurostat
Service labor share 0.69 0.09 0.46 0.94 2241
Log industrial compensation rate 3.64 0.62 1.23 5.93 2241
Log service compensation rate 3.22 0.49 1.04 4.14 2241
Log HH-Income per capita (PPP) 9.52 0.37 8.20 10.46 2391
Employment rate 0.63 0.08 0.37 0.80 2303
Log outwards migration 9.28 0.90 5.39 11.58 764
Log total population of NUTS region 14.10 0.85 10.17 16.27 2447
Log GDP p. capita of NUTS region 9.83 0.54 7.65 11.48 2420
Weighted export competition 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.15 2462
Comtrade
Weighted import competition 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.14 2462
Log imports from China of home country 19.09 1.42 13.33 21.87 2462
Log total imports of home country 19.23 1.34 13.58 22.17 2462
Log imports from China of export markets 23.10 0.85 18.12 24.78 2462
Log total imports of export markets 25.67 0.69 20.40 27.18 2462
Log GDP p. capita of home country 10.19 0.27 9.27 10.80 2462 WDILog GDP p. capita of export markets 9.53 0.30 7.06 10.10 2462
WDI: World Development Index
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Table C.5: Countries for Which Data Are Available
Home countries
Product- UN-industry- Eurostat-industry- Regional-
level level level level
dataset dataset dataset dataset
Australia 7
Austria 7 7 7
Belgium 7 7 7
Canada 7 7
Czech Republic 7 7 7 7
Denmark 7 7 7
Finland 7 7 7 7
France 7 7 7 7
Germany 7 7 7 7
Greece 7 7 7 7
Hungary 7 7 7 7
Iceland 7 7
Ireland 7 7 7 7
Italy 7 7 7 7
Japan 7 7
Mexico 7 7
Netherlands 7 7 7
New Zealand 7
Norway 7 7 7 7
Poland 7 7 7 7
Portugal 7 7 7 7
Republic of Korea 7 7
Slovakia 7 7 7 7
Spain 7 7 7 7
Sweden 7 7 7 7
Switzerland 7 7
Turkey 7
United Kingdom 7 7 7 7
United States of America 7 7
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